Dag Seierstad has participated actively in Norwegian EU debate since the early 1960`s when it first was on the agenda. He is currently advisor on European affairs for the Socialist party (SV) in Parliament, and member of the Central board of Nei til EU ("No to EU"). Seierstad is a very respected representative of the intellectual, leftist EU opposision in Norway and he frequently writes EU articles in the newspapers Klassekampen and Nationen.
Dag Seierstad recently wrote the following article for the magazine "British Politics review" 1/2008.
"The rationale for opposing Norwegian membership in the European Union" :
On two occasions, by referendum in 1972 and 1994, a majority of Norwegian voters have rejected EU membership. Opposition against the EU has been dominated by groups of the centre-left: there is little organised opposition in Norway of the kind represented in Britain by business interests and the Conservative Party.
Two themes have been fundamental in Norway for the campaign against membership. First, there is the perception that cherished democratic values at the national as well as the local level are best retained outside the EU. Second, there is scepticism in Norway towards the market liberalism embedded in successive EU treaties.
The EU designs a society where local and national communities are replaced by companies and banks as the fundamental building blocks. Our vision of Europe refers to a different understanding of liberty than the four liberties of the EU’s inner market. We look towards the kind of autonomy that retains in local authorities and states the right to limit the market freedoms if it is necessary in order to achieve important social purposes
The debate seen from Norway is essentially about whether companies or communities should be the units given the fundamental freedom of action within Europe. The departure point for the Norwegian anti-EU movement is that the EU should be limited to tackling challenges that can only be controlled at the international level: cross-national conflicts, environmental problems crossing borders, common minimum standards in the labour market and social imbalances between the regions of Europe.
The four freedoms of the EU require that national, regional or local communities do not intervene into solutions created by free-running market forces. Any regulation of the markets is supposed to take place only at the level of the European Union.
This idea represents the basic democratic weakness related to the European project. Nowhere in Western Europe is the lack of free movement any important problem today. On the opposite: there are challenges of a far different nature that are much more important to resolve: rising unemployment, declining welfare states, disintegrating communities, health queues, drug abuse and increasing levels of violence and crime.
These problems can only be resolved through popular commitment to credible social projects, designed to make people take responsibility where they live and work. At all crossroads in the development of the EU more power and more decisions have been transferred to EU institutions. This touches upon the essential core of democracy: the scope for democratically elected power to control decisions of human and social concern. This power is quintessential if democracy is to be meaningful.
Norway is a community of suitable size to develop the initiatives and solidarity needed to fight unemployment, repair our welfare state and develop policies for protecting the environment that can rely on firm support by the citizes. Our arguments may be of a different nature than British EU scepticism. Yet their message is universal as far as the value of the elected representative is concerned. The individual MP in a British constituency should feel this as clearly as do Norwegian parliamentarians.
Supranational arrangements are sometimes necessary, but in order to have grass roots support, they must be limited to the absolutely necessary. Supranationalism in the EU is applied in far too many issue areas, and it limits national autonomy in areas where it should not.
The EU has always been a strange mix of the inter-state and supranational. But the combination affects different countries differently. To small and medium-sized countries the EU becomes gradually more supranational: they can be voted down and must heed to decisions which they have opposed. To the biggest EU countries, EU cooperation is closer to the inter-state model. In order to avoid being voted down, they negotiate to make compromises they can agree upon in order to present them as fait accomplies to the smaller countries.
As an EU member, Norway will be obligated to enter the EU’s monetary union. Norway is the country in Western Europe where the euro will be the least appropriate, due to its particular economic structure. We largely export goods that feed into the productive capacity of other countries. For this reason we often need the direct opposite of the macroeconomic policy led by the eurozone, as our economic cycles differ. The success of the British economy, even though it differs from the Scandinavian countries, exemplifies the value of maintaining control over national currency and macroeconomic policy.
Outside of the EU Norway has a right to speak and propose in the world community, a right which both Sweden and Denmark have had to refrain from since entering the Union. Admittedly, within the WTO framework, Norway may be fighting for the narrow sectoral interests of Norwegian farmers, with little attention paid to the effects upon the developing world and the environment. However, in international institutions dealing with the environment, world poverty etc., Norway has been willing to act as part of an avant-garde by forging alliances with countries outside the European and American sphere, often in clear opposition to theUSA and the EU.
From this perspective, our EU scepticism is about a belief in autonomy rather than patriotism as such. Internationally, Norway fights for its national interest in trade, fisheries and to support its few industrial champions. But since our economic interests are rather few and limited in scope, we are also disposed to listen to concerns for global solidarity, especially where this reflects popular opinion in Norway. In this regard Norway may be small enough to mobilise popular support for international activism related to issues such as climate change, hunger and deprivation on other continents and global security.
The option for global solidarity is not always reflected in political action. But the fact that the option exists makes politics a whole lot more meaningful for the common man and woman in Norway compared to the intricacies of EU decision making. The Norwegian Parliament, like Westminster, is far from the individual voter: Brussels, however, is much farther away and too detached from democratic control. If we wish politics more based on solidarity values, and if we wish to take the people with us on that endeavour, we must begin at the level where democratic power is real. This is a thesis of equal significance to both Britain and Norway.
On two occasions, by referendum in 1972 and 1994, a majority of Norwegian voters have rejected EU membership. Opposition against the EU has been dominated by groups of the centre-left: there is little organised opposition in Norway of the kind represented in Britain by business interests and the Conservative Party.
Two themes have been fundamental in Norway for the campaign against membership. First, there is the perception that cherished democratic values at the national as well as the local level are best retained outside the EU. Second, there is scepticism in Norway towards the market liberalism embedded in successive EU treaties.
The EU designs a society where local and national communities are replaced by companies and banks as the fundamental building blocks. Our vision of Europe refers to a different understanding of liberty than the four liberties of the EU’s inner market. We look towards the kind of autonomy that retains in local authorities and states the right to limit the market freedoms if it is necessary in order to achieve important social purposes
The debate seen from Norway is essentially about whether companies or communities should be the units given the fundamental freedom of action within Europe. The departure point for the Norwegian anti-EU movement is that the EU should be limited to tackling challenges that can only be controlled at the international level: cross-national conflicts, environmental problems crossing borders, common minimum standards in the labour market and social imbalances between the regions of Europe.
The four freedoms of the EU require that national, regional or local communities do not intervene into solutions created by free-running market forces. Any regulation of the markets is supposed to take place only at the level of the European Union.
This idea represents the basic democratic weakness related to the European project. Nowhere in Western Europe is the lack of free movement any important problem today. On the opposite: there are challenges of a far different nature that are much more important to resolve: rising unemployment, declining welfare states, disintegrating communities, health queues, drug abuse and increasing levels of violence and crime.
These problems can only be resolved through popular commitment to credible social projects, designed to make people take responsibility where they live and work. At all crossroads in the development of the EU more power and more decisions have been transferred to EU institutions. This touches upon the essential core of democracy: the scope for democratically elected power to control decisions of human and social concern. This power is quintessential if democracy is to be meaningful.
Norway is a community of suitable size to develop the initiatives and solidarity needed to fight unemployment, repair our welfare state and develop policies for protecting the environment that can rely on firm support by the citizes. Our arguments may be of a different nature than British EU scepticism. Yet their message is universal as far as the value of the elected representative is concerned. The individual MP in a British constituency should feel this as clearly as do Norwegian parliamentarians.
Supranational arrangements are sometimes necessary, but in order to have grass roots support, they must be limited to the absolutely necessary. Supranationalism in the EU is applied in far too many issue areas, and it limits national autonomy in areas where it should not.
The EU has always been a strange mix of the inter-state and supranational. But the combination affects different countries differently. To small and medium-sized countries the EU becomes gradually more supranational: they can be voted down and must heed to decisions which they have opposed. To the biggest EU countries, EU cooperation is closer to the inter-state model. In order to avoid being voted down, they negotiate to make compromises they can agree upon in order to present them as fait accomplies to the smaller countries.
As an EU member, Norway will be obligated to enter the EU’s monetary union. Norway is the country in Western Europe where the euro will be the least appropriate, due to its particular economic structure. We largely export goods that feed into the productive capacity of other countries. For this reason we often need the direct opposite of the macroeconomic policy led by the eurozone, as our economic cycles differ. The success of the British economy, even though it differs from the Scandinavian countries, exemplifies the value of maintaining control over national currency and macroeconomic policy.
Outside of the EU Norway has a right to speak and propose in the world community, a right which both Sweden and Denmark have had to refrain from since entering the Union. Admittedly, within the WTO framework, Norway may be fighting for the narrow sectoral interests of Norwegian farmers, with little attention paid to the effects upon the developing world and the environment. However, in international institutions dealing with the environment, world poverty etc., Norway has been willing to act as part of an avant-garde by forging alliances with countries outside the European and American sphere, often in clear opposition to theUSA and the EU.
From this perspective, our EU scepticism is about a belief in autonomy rather than patriotism as such. Internationally, Norway fights for its national interest in trade, fisheries and to support its few industrial champions. But since our economic interests are rather few and limited in scope, we are also disposed to listen to concerns for global solidarity, especially where this reflects popular opinion in Norway. In this regard Norway may be small enough to mobilise popular support for international activism related to issues such as climate change, hunger and deprivation on other continents and global security.
The option for global solidarity is not always reflected in political action. But the fact that the option exists makes politics a whole lot more meaningful for the common man and woman in Norway compared to the intricacies of EU decision making. The Norwegian Parliament, like Westminster, is far from the individual voter: Brussels, however, is much farther away and too detached from democratic control. If we wish politics more based on solidarity values, and if we wish to take the people with us on that endeavour, we must begin at the level where democratic power is real. This is a thesis of equal significance to both Britain and Norway.
